

C-M(85)75

106. A good example of the effect of carefully prepared and well timed mass expulsions is France where, despite changes at the top level of the KGB residency, the Soviet services are trying hard to recoup the losses they suffered from the 1983 expulsions and adopt, for the time being, a very cautious attitude. During the period under review France expelled the Soviet Consul General in Marseilles, a GRU officer.

107. The continuing aggressiveness of the Soviet services in the United States and the level of damage that can occur to national security were illustrated by a number of espionage arrests during the last few months, notably in the WALKER spy-ring case. As of June 1985 the number of staff serving at official or semi-official Soviet representations in the United States was up by 232 compared with May 1984 and amounted to 1,410 persons. Approximately 35% of these officials are identified or suspected intelligence officers or co-opted agents. One Soviet intelligence officer was expelled from the United States.

108. Belgium expelled a Soviet intelligence officer and banned another permanently from the country. In the wake of the TREHOLT case and the expulsion of ten Soviet intelligence officers in 1984, KGB activities in Norway were reduced to a minimum. However, there are still 49 suspected or identified Soviet intelligence officers in Norway - 40% of the officials there. In Spain, despite Soviet insistence, requests for the opening of new consulates and for the exchange of military attaches were denied, thus also curbing the expansion of intelligence collecting facilities for the time being. Spain expelled a suspected KGB officer during the period under review. After the defection of the Deputy Resident of the GRU in Athens, Sergei BOKHANE, Soviet case officers left Greece before decisions on possible expulsions could be made. Three Greeks were arrested.

109. The other Soviet bloc intelligence services were active to a varying degree in different areas in NATO member countries. As in previous periods under review the EGIS maintained their leading role in the Federal Republic of Germany. Particular damage to German counter-intelligence was caused in August 1985 when Hans-Joachim TIEDGE, an officer of the "Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutz" (BfV) who headed the section dealing with the EGIS defected to the German Democratic Republic. The EGIS retained a relatively high presence in the United States with 50% of their officials considered to be engaged in intelligence activities. Intelligence activities of the EGIS were also observed in Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom.

110. The Polish Intelligence Services (PIS) continued to operate aggressively in the United States, a tendency that was also noted in Belgium, Canada, France, Germany and the Netherlands. In Denmark the strength of the PIS increased from about 15% to 25% of the Polish officials working there, but this has so far not led to a corresponding increase in activity. The Italian diplomatic representation in Warsaw was subject to persistent penetration attempts by the PIS during the period under review. Five Polish intelligence officers were expelled from the United States and one from France during 1985.

111. The Czech Intelligence Services (CzIS) remained active in most NATO member countries but concentrated their efforts on Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. Activities of the Hungarian Intelligence Services (HIS) were especially noted in Canada, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Romanian Intelligence Services (RoIS) attracted the attention of counter-espionage services in Canada, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom.

112. The Bulgarian Intelligence Services (BIS), which continued to be the most subservient to the Soviets of all the Soviet bloc services, have been dynamic in the United States and are considered to be highly effective in their intelligence operations. This is most probably directly attributable to specific support by the Soviet services. The BIS have been active in Canada, from where one of its members was recently expelled and have also been active in Italy, Spain and Turkey. The expulsion of nine Bulgarian citizens who, while travelling in Turkey, were caught in intelligence collecting activities in 1984, did not result in a lessening of the activity of the BIS in Turkey. During the period under review Turkey had again to expel four Bulgarian "legal travellers".

Other Countries

113. The trend in the activity of the Intelligence Services of the People's Republic of China (PRCIS) in the United States was towards more numerous and increasingly clandestine intelligence operations. The number of staff at representations of the PRC was up by 170 and amounted to 1,252 in July 1985. The PRCIS showed increased efforts in various fields, also in Canada and were active in France, Spain and the United Kingdom. The main concern of the Cuban Intelligence Services (CuIS) in the United States, in addition to collecting information on United States military disposition and readiness, has been to counter the activities of anti-CASTRO groups. During the period under review a Cuban intelligence officer was expelled from the United States. In June 1985 the Cubans nominated Francisco RAMOS ALVAREZ to be their next Ambassador to the United Kingdom. RAMOS is a long standing and active member of the CuIS whose appointment was likely to have resulted in an improvement in the quality and level of Cuban intelligence effort in the United Kingdom. The Cubans were invited to withdraw their nomination and did so. The CuIS are also operating in Canada. In Canada the Yugoslav Intelligence Services were again particularly active. The Libyan and Iranian Intelligence Services have carried out operations in Italy, the former against economic targets and individuals who could be exploited in insular Italy, and the latter with the aim of combatting dissidents.

Main Targets

114. As in the previous period under review intelligence targets in NATO member countries included the whole spectrum of politics, peace and disarmament, economy, defence, science and technology and emigres. Of these defence and science and technology continued to be of particularly high interest to HoIS. HoIS were again involved in operations designed to influence public opinion and the decision-making processes in NATO member countries by means of disinformation and the use of agents of influence.

C-M(85)75

Political and Security

115. There was little change in collection activities of the HoIS in the field of political espionage. These remained directed at domestic and foreign policy including relations between NATO member countries, disarmament issues, trade relations, political parties, trade unions and peace groups.

116. In the Federal Republic of Germany the EGIS and the KGB continued to target the state and government apparatus. Espionage efforts were directed inter alia against the Office of the Federal President (Margret HOEKE case), the Ministry of Economics (Sonja LUENEBURG), and the Office of the Federal Chancellor (Herta-Astrid WILLNER), and also against agencies such as the Refugees' Federation (Ursula RICHTER). Several of the agents managed to flee to the German Democratic Republic. Margret HOEKE and a married couple with whom she had co-operated for intelligence purposes were arrested.

117. The interest of the Soviet Services in Western peace movements has continued. In the Netherlands the KGB again focussed its attention on the issue of deployment of Cruise missiles and continued its attempts to influence the decision-making in its final stage. Of the Soviet bloc services the EGIS and the Czech Services have maintained links with the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the United Kingdom. The EGIS also displayed a special interest in Italy regarding government plans to counter the protest against the deployment of Cruise missiles and in Spain they were involved in frequent contacts with pacifist groups. In Canada the KGB specially monitored peace groups coupled with "active measures" of a noticeable anti-US and anti-NATO orientation.

118. Political intelligence priorities for Soviet Services in the United Kingdom and the United States included the stance of these countries regarding the arms limitation talks in Geneva which began in March 1985. In Spain the integration into the European Economic Community and the adherence to NATO received continued attention from Soviet Services and attempts were made to influence certain mass media in order to strengthen neutralist currents. In Greece the Soviet bloc services continued to centre on Greek relations with the Alliance and the European Economic Community, and on the domestic political situation. In the United Kingdom a number of HoIS, notably the Chinese, Czech, East German and Cuban Services have maintained their interest in African affairs, not least through links with African revolutionary groups. In the United States Soviet Intelligence Services continued to collect information on the Administration's plans and intentions concerning the Third World with a focus on the use of American forces in these areas. The Western European Union was the object of close attention by Chinese and Czech Services. There was continued interest by HoIS in the security services especially in Germany, Italy and the United States.

119. In April 1985 the Norwegian diplomat, Arne TREHOLT, was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment - the maximum penalty - for political espionage for the Soviet Union and Iraq. He has appealed against this sentence.

Defence

120. The intelligence efforts of the Soviet bloc Intelligence Services in the field of defence were, as before, targetted on NATO, on the national armed forces of member countries, their organization, equipment and armament, their readiness and alert plans, military training doctrines, defence policy in general and deployment policy of nuclear arms in Western Europe, and military aspects of disarmament. In the United States the KGB and Cuban Services increased their efforts to report indications that the United States is considering the use of military force in any area of the world, to report on unanticipated meetings of high level officials, unusual troop movements and concentrations, as well as medical activities by the United States Armed Forces which might reflect a preparation for combat. Continuity of government plans for implementation in a national emergency were also targetted. There was no noticeable change in collection objectives regarding Western developments of weapons and weapon systems. The broad array of classified military-related high technology included anti-submarine warfare (ASW) technology, deep-sea submarine equipment, anti-aircraft missiles, electronic guidance systems, "Very High-Speed Integrated Circuits (VHSIC)" for missiles, cruise missile technology, micro-electronics, aircraft design, radar systems, optical fibres, communication equipment, fire simulation systems, lasers and laser aiming systems, methods of separation of isotopes.

121. During the period under review the WALKER spy-ring represented a classic case of military espionage in the United States. Four members of this ring have been arrested so far and charged with espionage for the Soviet Union. Investigations, however, are continuing to determine whether there are any additional members. John WALKER and Jerry WHITWORTH had access to sensitive cryptographic information, extremely sensitive information about United States cypher systems as well as classified naval communications. In the LAPTEV case, which was concluded in 1984 with the expulsion from Belgium of three Russian intelligence officers, an attempt was made to recruit a member of NATO staff who was tasked to procure specific documents marked "Secret" such as the "Long Term Scientific Study" (implications of new technologies for land operations in the NATO Central Region), "Civil Emergency Papers" and records of meetings of the NATO Military Committee.

Scientific and Technical

122. The principal aim of Soviet bloc overt and covert intelligence gathering is science and technology intelligence. Activity in this field by HoIS continued to be determined by military requirements but it is also relevant to economic requirements of Soviet bloc countries. The recent case of the expelled Soviet intelligence officer, MAKEEV, in Belgium and arrests in Greece once more confirm this. The following were the primary interest areas in the period under review:

- (a) oil/gas industry, arctic, offshore and undersea research and development, petrochemical industry, agricultural and chemical engineering, subterranean sublimation and liquification processes of coal;